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A case involving Microsoft that is currently before the US courts has raised important is-
sues between the respective legal regimes in the European Union and the United States,
particularly in relation to the protection of personal data. The case in question has given
rise to a degree of legal uncertainty and the outcome could have potentially serious im-
plications for data protection in the EU. By seeking direct access to data held in the EU
through the US judicial system, existing legal mechanisms for mutual assistance between
jurisdictions may be being effectively bypassed. There are fundamental issues at stake
here as regards the protection of personal data that is held within the European Union.
This is clearly an area where technological advances have taken place in a very rapid
fashion. The right to privacy should be afforded maximum protection whilst ensuring that
law enforcement agencies have the necessary mechanisms at their disposal to effectively
fight serious crime.2
© 2015 Dan Svantesson and Felicity Gerry. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Anyone reading the technology section of any major news-
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ty Gerry. Published by Elcontroversy between Microsoft, the US Government and the
European Union. The US wants to force Microsoft to provide
third-party content held on a server in Ireland. The EU says
that Microsoft cannot transfer the relevant data to the US
without considering EU data privacy law. Microsoft has
become the proverbial ‘meat in the sandwich’.
The case has raised fundamental issues on jurisdiction
and extraterritorial evidence collection. The focus of many
has been on the conflict between EU and US laws or legal
procedure in the context of privacy or data protection but
in fact the issues highlight a global problem: Where the
activity of an individual or entity is across more than one
State and Territory, whether that activity is criminal
or commercial or some other form of behaviour, particu-
larly where that activity is conducted online, the current
legal responses are slow and ineffective. At the same time
the ad hoc responses by some nations, notably the US, is
intrusive and often lacking any solid foundation in inter-
national law.sevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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However, the issues associated with access to extraterritorial
evidence go further than what surfaces in the Microsoft cloud
case. To paint a slightmore complete picture of the difficulties
facing transnational litigants and investigators in this field,
we also bring attention to and discuss issues arising not just in
relation to internet intermediaries but particularly those
involved in combatting transnational organised crime. Here
the issue is not so much the proper law for the conduct of
litigation but the collection of relevant evidence across terri-
torial borders. This can arise in any international commercial
action that requires evidential collection. In the cyber context
this is where there is an intersection between criminal and
commercial legal principles, particularly where breaches of
privacy rules in some countries come with criminal penalties
and/or significant financial sanction.
Take for example a legitimate international investment
company operating across the globe using domain names and
websites and call centres as well as banking institutions and
then think about at least one case within the authors’ expe-
rience3 where an international investment fraud was carried
out by use of falsified websites posted globally where the of-
fenders duped investors into transferring funds, maintained
the deception with falsified monthly reports and dissipated
the assets before discovery where the actors were based in
Asia but victims were global. The litigation that arises in the
investigation of such an operation is both commercial and
criminal and the evidence has the potential to be on servers in
numerous locations. Decisions have to be made on which
country has the jurisdiction to prosecute, where to serve
warrants for the production of material and how to collate the
material required not just to decide whether the operation is
legitimate or not but to enable legal intervention at all. Often
the result is piecemeal proceedings against identifiable in-
dividuals (sometimes themselves being exploited) and the
main operators avoid sanction. If these issues are not
addressed, and addressed globally there is little prospect of a
solution.
Conversely, imagine an individual who is the subject of
inappropriate litigation by a former business partner who
seeks disclosure of trade information that will fundamentally
compromise the business. The company is based in one
country, the server in another and the litigious adversary in a
third. Why should one person have easy access to private in-
formation of anotherewhether business or personal and how
much more frightening is it the potential for Governments
engaged in enquiries (commercial or criminal) could, through
individual judges without legal precedent, bypass scrutiny
and engage in draconian seizure policies.
In all of the above examples there is always evidence on-
line (social media, emails, websites, messaging etc) and other
more physical evidence within territories (confessions, di-





document-frauds-2056080.collected and usedwithin a reasonable space of time?What of
the data and privacy issues? All too often there is a knee jerk
reaction to organised crime which inhibits the freedoms of
law abiding people and is used as a foundation for intrusive
State surveillance.
In the absence of a comprehensive global instrument in
this sphere,wewill consider the potential solutions in a cyber-
context and will outline and discuss a number of different
components that we suggest ought to be considered in any
ethical and principled move towards improving international
law and cooperation in the context of transnational extrater-
ritorial evidence.2. The Microsoft cloud case
In December 2013, the U.S. Government served a search
warrant on Microsoft under the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”). Thewarrant, issued by theUnited
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
authorised the search and seizure of information associated
with a specified web-based e-mail account that is stored at
premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by
Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”). Microsoft has opposed
the warrant since the relevant emails are located exclusively
on servers in Dublin, Ireland. Following a brief judgement
where the District Court upheld the Magistrate's judgment,
the matter is now to be decided in the Court of Appeal for the
Second Circuit New York.
Microsoft filed its brief on 8th of December and interest-
ingly it was followed by no less than 12 amicus briefs (‘friend
of the court’ briefs) supporting Microsoft. The amicus briefs
are even more interesting when one considers their diversity;
they were filed by, for example (1) businesses such as Apple,
Amazon, AT&T, Verizon and a range of media organisations,
(2) academic experts including an expert on international law
and a group of computer scientists (3) public interest organi-
sations such as the Center for Democracy & Technology and
the Digital Rights Ireland Limited, (4) the Irish Government
and (5) a Member of the European Parliament. Such a united
front amongst such a diverse group is rare but perhaps reflects
the serious issues being discussed. What has followed is a
great deal of high level international political attention. Here,
we will briefly analyse the key legal issues involved in the
case. However, to prepare ground for that discussion, we will
first discuss jurisdiction in more general terms.
2.1. Jurisdiction generally
At Common law, questions of jurisdiction have traditionally
arisen in the context of territorial borders. In Ward v The
Queen4 it was said that the accused was standing on the
Victorian bank of the Murray River when he shot and killed
the victim who as on the opposite bank in New South Wales.
The High Court was faced with a federal system where each
state had an obligation to not interferewith the affairs of other
states and was asked to decide whether the act of murder had
occurred at the point the trigger was pulled in Victoria or4 (1980) 142 CLR 308.
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was in fact resolved by historical evidence which demon-
strated that the borders had been incorrectly identified and
the defendant had been wrongly tried in Victoria.
This follows the common law tradition that if an act takes
place within the relevant country, the courts of that country
will have jurisdiction to try the offence subject to the alloca-
tion of business between court centres and the selection of the
appropriate court. In 1891, Lord Halsbury LC stated: “All crime
is local. The jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country
where the crime is committed …”.5 Only124 years later this is
clearly an impossible approach.
Outside of the common law tradition, jurisdiction was to a
great extent based on nationality; trying citizens for their
conduct, although historically this was conduct within terri-
torial boundaries in any event. More recently prosecutorial
jurisdiction has been the subject of codification or statutory
exception depending on the State concerned and the legal
tradition. The general tendency is to enlarge jurisdiction to
prosecute beyond territorial boundaries but these are piece-
meal and generally related to conspiracies or child abuse.
Such extraterritorial jurisdiction is often dealt with in com-
mercial litigation by lengthy arguments on proper law. It is
here that the law is confronted by increasing technology and
transport that cuts across borders with great ease. Countries
now have competing claims to jurisdiction and issues of Par-
liamentary Sovereignty can makes commercial cases inher-
ently political.
Decisions on jurisdiction can also be evidential on the
grounds of nexus e particularly in conspiracies e this can
include factors such as the location of witnesses and other
evidence and in the context of extradition can include
consideration of whether an alleged offence is also an offence
in the requesting country. The Swedish extradition request for
Julian Assange led the English courts into protracted consid-
eration of whether the laws of Sweden and England on rape
were sufficiently similar to allow for extradition.6 Sometimes
there are also issues of fairness and if a legal team in one
country asserts that an individual cannot receive a fair trial in
another, this is also intensely political. It is not hard to see
why; in the context of commercial litigation theMicrosoft case
has created such a significant reaction.
In the criminal law context, where there is a significant
degree of mutual co-operation between agencies, the
competent authority will be the one where there is a clear link
between the actions of the domestic police and the pro-
ceedings to which the defendant becomes subject during the
course of the investigation.7 Many States have enacted legis-
lation to allow for extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute
criminal offending that has a nexuswith the prosecuting State
or is committed by a citizen of that State in another. The
effectiveness of such legal proceedings depend on mutual
legal assistance treaties (MLAT) where there is agreement
between two or more countries for the purpose of gathering
and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public5 Macleod v. Attorney-General (NSW) [1891] AC 455 at 458.
6 Assange v Sweden [2012] UKSC 22, 2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin).
7 See for example George Francis Burns v HM Advocate [2008]
UKPC 63, a prosecution relating to indecent images of children.laws or criminal laws. These have been developed over time,
rarely apply to commercial litigation and are slow to react to
technological development.
It is immediately apparent that jurisdiction can be sepa-
rated into more than one legal issue. For example, it is
customary to distinguish between three different forms of
jurisdiction; that is: (1) prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction,
(2) judicial (or adjudicative) jurisdiction, and (3) enforcement
jurisdiction. However, not least due to the increase in cross-
border contacts that stem from the Internet, it is useful to
also consider a fourth type of jurisdiction e what we can call
investigative jurisdiction.8
As is well known, prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction
relates to the power to make law in relation to a specific
subject matter. Judicial (or adjudicative) jurisdiction, as the
name suggests, deals with the power to adjudicate a particular
matter. And, finally, enforcement jurisdiction relates to the
power to enforce the law put in place, in the sense of, for
example, arresting, prosecuting and/or punishing an individ-
ual under that law.
Investigative jurisdiction e where considered at all e is
treated as a component of enforcement jurisdiction under
conventional thinking.
Investigative jurisdiction relates to the power to investi-
gate a matter and must be kept separate from the jurisdiction
to make rules, adjudicate disputes and to actually enforce the
law.
Perhaps the most important reason for treating investiga-
tive jurisdiction as a separate and distinct form of jurisdiction
is found in the fact that, a state may have a range of reasons
for wanting to investigate a matter without ending up exer-
cising adjudicative jurisdiction over the matter, or applying
prescriptive jurisdiction to the matter, or indeed, seeking to
take any enforcement actions against the person it in-
vestigates. Such an outcome would, for example, be the case
where (1) the investigation shows that there is no reason to
pursue the matter, or more importantly (2) where the inves-
tigation shows that the matter is best dealt with by a request
seeking another state to claim adjudicative, legislative and
enforcement jurisdiction over the matter. In light of this, it
does not make sense to bundle investigative jurisdiction with
enforcement jurisdiction, as is traditionally done.
The instances where investigative jurisdiction plays a
central role are numerous, for example, in the context of data
privacy law and in areas such as consumer protection e areas
where complaints often are best pursued by bodies such as
privacy commissioners/ombudsmen and consumer protec-
tion agencies. Indeed, the crucial importance of distinguishing
investigative jurisdiction from other forms of jurisdiction was
at the core of a 2007 decision by the Federal Court of Canada.
In Lawson v Accusearch Inc dba Abika.com [2007] 4 FCR 314,
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada was forced to defend, in
court, her decision to decline to investigate a complaint made
by Lawson of the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest
Clinic against a US-based corporation. Harrington J of the
Federal Court stated that:8 The discussion of “investigative jurisdiction” draws, and ex-
pands, upon: Dan Svantesson, Extraterritoriality in Data Privacy
Law (Ex Tuto Publishing, 2013), at 67e69.
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PIPEDA [Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act] gives no indication that Parliament intended to
legislate extraterritorially. [...] [However, the] Commissioner does
not lose her power to investigate because she can neither sub-
poena the organization nor enter its premises in Wyoming. [...] It
would be most regrettable indeed if Parliament gave the
Commissioner jurisdiction to investigate foreigners who have
Canadian sources of information only if those organizations
voluntarily name names. Furthermore, even if an order against a
non-resident might be ineffective, the Commissioner could target
the Canadian sources of information.
I conclude as a matter of statutory interpretation that the
Commissioner had jurisdiction to investigate, and that such an
investigation was not contingent upon Parliament having
legislated extraterritorially[.]9
The currently ongoing dispute between Microsoft and the
U.S. Government about the Government's attempt to make
Microsoft provide details of an e-mail account held by
Microsoft's subsidiary in Ireland is a good illustration of why
the time is right to distinguish, define and delineate investi-
gative jurisdiction.
Looking at the Microsoft case, the very fact that dispute
arose in the first place highlights that contemporary juris-
dictional thinking has failed to adequately address the chal-
lenges posed by the Internet in general, and perhaps cloud
computing in particular. This failure may party be blamed on
the law's unwillingness to part with traditional catego-
risations and thinking so as to recognise models and struc-
tures that better correspond to the new technological reality.
Here we focus on evidence collection starting with the
detail of the Microsoft case.
2.2. Presumption against extraterritoriality
There is a longstanding presumption in U.S. law that “[w]hen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial appli-
cation, it has none.”10 This follows the common law tradition.
In Lord Halsbury's language, it is a “local” law. Microsoft ar-
gues that “the search and seizure occur in Dublin, where the
emails reside”11 and thus is extraterritorial. Or, put differently,
as summarised by the magistrate judge James C. Francis IV,
Microsoft is arguing that:
Federal courts are without authority to issue warrants for the
search and seizure of property outside the territorial limits of the
United States. Therefore, [...] to the extent that the warrant here
requires acquisition of information from Dublin, it is unautho-
rized and must be quashed.129 Lawson v Accusearch Inc dba Abika.com [2007] 4 FCR 314 https://
www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2007/2007fc125/2007fc125.html.
10 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) at 255.
11 Brief by Appellant Microsoft Corporation, In the Matter of a
Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corporation (No. 14-2985-cv) at 26.
12 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., __ F. Supp. 2d. __, No. 13 Mag.
2814, 2014 WL 1661004, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014) 8e9.Commenting on this assertion, the magistrate judge
observed that: “That analysis, while not inconsistent with the
statutory language, is undermined by the structure of the SCA
[Stored Communications Act (passed as part of the ECPA)], by
its legislative history, and by the practical consequences that
would flow from adopting it.”13 (emphasis added).
This is a key sentence that perhaps can decide the matter.
In light of the reasoning by the magistrate judge that Micro-
soft's analysis is not inconsistent with the statutory language it is
hardly possible to say that the relevant law gives a clear indi-
cation of an extraterritorial application, and thus it has none.
However, the conclusion was that extraterritorial jurisdiction
could be implied. This was justified by reference to the fact
that there is an equally strong tradition that the interpretation
of a statute includes consideration of Parliament's intention.
To avoid deviating too far from the theme of this article, we
will not delve into that matter in detail here.2.3. Extraterritorial or not?
The real question is consequently whether the issue of
extraterritoriality arises in the first place. If it does, Microsoft
must be successful, and if it does not, the inquiry will have to
go on. Unsurprisingly, Microsoft says the issue of extraterri-
toriality obviously does arise, and the U.S. Government claims
that it equally obviously does not. The difference in perspec-
tive is apparent throughout, but is particularly well illustrated
in the following quote from the Government's brief of 9 June
2014:
Relying on Section 432(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations, Microsoft argues that ‘[a] state’s law enforcement of-
ficers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state
only with the consent of the other state.’ [...] But requiring the
disclosure of records by a U.S. company does not involve any
enforcement activity by government personnel on foreign terri-
tory, which is the concern of that section.14
Reading this quote carefully, it is obvious that Microsoft
and the U.S. Government are talking about two different
things, and that they are arguably both correct. It is true, as the
Government says that there is no enforcement activity on
foreign territory. However, and this is important, there is an
exercise of law enforcement functions in the territory of another
state. In other words, the Government looks exclusively to the
location from which jurisdiction is exercised (the US). Micro-
soft considers also the extraterritorial effects and they occur
in Ireland. In this way, the US Government gives extraterri-
toriality a narrow definition, while Microsoft gives it a broader
definition. It is in a sense just the same issue that arose in
Ward v The Queen albeit a virtual shot and across an ocean
rather than a river.1513 Id. at 9.
14 Government's Brief in Support of the Magistrate Judge's De-
cision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose Re-
cords Within its Custody and Control, In the Matter of a Warrant
to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corporation (1:13-mj-02814) at 21.
15 Ibid paragraph 10.
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“The principle against extraterritoriality presumes that
Congress does not intend for a law to apply extraterritorially. It
does not presume Congress's intention to be that the law has
no incidental effects outside the country whatsoever.”16 This,
the Government supports by referring to the following quote:
“Even where the significant effects of the regulated conduct
are felt outside U.S. borders, the statute itself does not present
a problem of extraterritoriality, so long as the conduct which
Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the United
States.”17
However, here we are just going around in circles since the
quote above may equally well support Microsoft's view
depending on what we characterise as the conduct in question.
In our view, we have (likeMrWard's bullet) here hit a dead end.2.4. From proxy principles to core principles and more
To understand which interpretation of extraterritoriality we
should favour, it is necessary to view the presumption against
extraterritoriality in its proper light. This presumption, just
like the Charming Betsy doctrine also discussed in the context of
the case18 (put simply ‘statutes should be construed to be
consistent with international law’) are proxies for, or expres-
sions of, the one and same core principle; that is, the pre-
sumption that Congress does not wish to enact law that will
create clashes of interest with foreign states. In other words
the presumption against extraterritoriality is just a proxy
principle conveniently adopted as the focal point in aworld, at
the time, dominated by a territorial focus. The question that
arises here is whether, perhaps unwittingly, the Magistrate in
the Microsoft case, exposed a modern approach to legislative
interpretation based on community needs not individual
sovereignty.
This in turn gives rise to examination of Parliamentary
Sovereignty in the context of a global community. The court
here was required to balance essential rights to a fair trial.
Without the necessary evidence, held by an organisation that
operates in more than one State, the litigation would be
compromised. At the same time, the issues engaged rights to
privacy. These are not merely questions for the US Constitu-
tion or the equivalent Irish instruments but for the interna-
tional community. The Internet is global and so there is an
argument that courts must take a global approach in deciding
the operation of domestic legislation.
The tradition of strict dualism, from decisions such as R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Bhajan
Singh19 which expounded the classical divide has changed.
Modern theoretical underpinning of dualist systems (na-
tional and international) recognize that courts can16 Government's Brief in Support of the Magistrate Judge's De-
cision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose Re-
cords Within its Custody and Control, In the Matter of a Warrant
to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corporation (1:13-mj-02814) at 19.
17 Envtl. Def. Fund. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531e32 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
18 See e.g.: Amicus brief of Verizon etc https://cdt.org/files/2014/
12/14-2985-Amicus-brief-of-Verizon-Cisco-HP-eBay-Salesforce.
com-and-Infor.pdf.
19 [1976] 1 QB 198 at 207.accommodate international law whether given effect by
valid legislation or by assisting in the development of the
common law. Even in cases where international law has not,
by legislation or valid executive action, been incorporated
into national law, there are occasional circumstances where
that law may be used by judges and other independent
decision-makers in the national legal system to influence
their decisions. This is particularly so in the case of inter-
national human rights principles as they have been
expounded, and developed, by international and regional
bodies.
An expression of what The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC
CMG has called this “modern approach” was given in
February 1988 in Bangalore, India, in the so-called Bangalore
Principles. Themeeting was chaired by Justice P N Bhagwati, a
former Chief Justice of India. Present was Lord Lester of
Herne Hill. Relevantly, the Bangalore Principles state, in
effect20:
 International law (whether human rights norms or other-
wise) is not, in most common law countries, part of do-
mestic law.
 Such law does not become part of domestic law until
Parliament so enacts or the judges (as another source of
law-making) declare the norms thereby established to be
part of domestic law.
 The judgeswill not do so automatically, simply because the
norm is part of international law or ismentioned in a treaty
e even one ratified by their own State.
 But if an issue of uncertainty arises (by a gap in the com-
mon law or obscurity in its meaning or ambiguity in a
relevant statute), a judge may seek guidance in the general
principles of international law, as accepted by the com-
munity of nations.
 From this source material, the judge may ascertain and
declare what the relevant rule of domestic law is. It is the
action of the judge, incorporating the rule into domestic
law, which makes it part of domestic law.
In terms, the Bangalore Principles declare:
 [T]here is a growing tendency for national courts to have
regard to these international norms for the purpose of
deciding cases where the domestic law e whether consti-
tutional, statute or common law e is uncertain or incom-
plete (Bangalore Principles No 4)
 It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and
well-established judicial functions for national courts to
have regard to international obligations which a country
undertakes e whether or not they have been incorporated
into domestic law e for the purpose of removing ambiguity
or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation or
common law (Bangalore Principles No 4)20 Taken in part from Kirby, Michael e “Domestic Implementa-
tion of International Human Rights Norms” [1999] AUJlHRights 27;
(1999) 5(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 109.
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the context of Commonwealth land rights.21 Here we have
property rights in the context of the contents of a server. This
is logical to ensure conformity where, for example, the law of
one country has been opened up to international remedies to
individuals pursuant to accession to international in-
struments such as the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This brings to bear on
the common law the powerful influence of the Covenant and
the international standards it imports. The law of an indi-
vidual Statemay not necessarily conform to international law,
but international law is a legitimate and important influence
on the development of domestic interpretation, especially
when international law declares the existence of universal
human rights. A doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in
the enjoyment of civil and political rights demands recon-
sideration. It is contrary both to international standards and
to the fundamental values to entrench a discriminatory rule.22
It follows that international obligationsmust be considered
in the performance of an administrative decision-making
process. Effectively the interpretation of the US instrument
requires due consideration of individual rights to a fair hear-
ing as against the rights of privacy. This leaves the courts
responsible for enforceable rights, utilising international law
where an appropriate gap appears or where a statute is
ambiguous or there is a conflict between legislation. Arguably
the same issues would then necessarily apply should there be
litigation in the context of any breach of EU legislation by
complying with the terms of the warrant. The Microsoft case
highlights not just the tasks of individual judges but also the
need for legal systems to work cooperatively in general har-
mony with the development of the international law of
human rights.
Whenever we are trying to apply the law to novel phe-
nomena that need to become the subject of clear legal rules,
we need to cut away the undergrowth of proxy principles and
identify the core principles that are reflected in those proxy
principles. Only then will we be able to focus on the consid-
erations and values that truly are to be balanced.
Applying this to the matter at hand we can usefully ask
whether jurisdictional claims with an extraterritorial effect
can create clashes of interest with foreign states. Here we
need not dig particularly deep; the answer is of course yes as is
evidenced by the strong European reactions to the Microsoft
case.23
U.S. Government may of course continue pushing its
argument that there is no extraterritoriality in the case.
However, we doubt that this senior court should have any21 See the remarks of Justice Brennan (with the concurrence of
Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh) in Mabo v Queensland
yt(No 2). In the course of explaining why a discriminatory doc-
trine, such as that of terra nullius (which declined recognition of
the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of a
settled colony such as Australia) could no longer be accepted as
part of the common law of Australia, Justice Brennan said:
22 See Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd.
23 Allison Grande, EU Official Slams US For Asking Microsoft For
Overseas Data, LAW360.COM (Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.law360.com/
articles/553140/eu-official-slams-us-for-asking-microsoft-for-
overseas-data.problems disposing of such an outdated and overly simplistic
claim about extraterritoriality.
Having reached this conclusion, the more interesting
question is of course whether a sensible system could be
developed allowing more effective law enforcement access to
cloud content. We return to that topic further below.3. The problems more broadly
The analysis of theMicrosoft cloud case above has highlighted
some aspects of the complexities associated with securing
access to extraterritorial evidence, particularly in the cloud
computing context. However, as we demonstrate below, there
are several other complications that also must be taken into
account.3.1. Domestic crime may require cross-border
investigation
The reality is that with increased globalisation comes an
increased globalisation of criminal activities, and just like
most people now communicate via email rather than postal
mail, and store their data in the cloud rather than locally on
their computers, tablets or phones, criminals also communi-
cate via email rather than postal mail, and store their data in
the cloud rather than locally on their computers, tablets or
phones. The obvious question is to what extent we can allow
this development to complicate law enforcement, and the
concerns involved are well illustrated in the U.S. Govern-
ment's Brief in Support of the Magistrate Judge's Decision:
In today’s digital environment, email and other electronic com-
munications are used extensively by criminals of all types in the
United States and abroad, from fraudsters to hackers to drug
dealers, in furtherance of violations of U.S. law. The ability to
obtain electronically stored information from domestic service
providersdpursuant to judicial authorization as required by the
SCAdis a fundamental component of effective modern law
enforcement. Yet such information, like the data sought by the
Warrant here, can be maintained in any location and moved
around the world easily, at any time and for any reason. Were
Microsoft’s position adopted, the Government’s ability to obtain
such information from a provider would turn entirely on whether
it happens to be stored here or abroad, even though the provider,
based in the United States, maintains control over the data
wherever it is. Such a regime would be rife with potential for
arbitrary outcomes and criminal abuse.24
In other words, should criminals be able to complicate and
prolong investigations by introducing an international
dimension simply by storing data on a server in another
country?24 Government's Brief in Support of the Magistrate Judge's De-
cision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose Re-
cords Within its Custody and Control, In the Matter of a Warrant to
Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Micro-
soft Corporation (1:13-mj-02814) at #.
27 Felicity Gerry QC and Nadya Berova, The rule of law online:
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makers may limit law enforcement efforts beyond what
arguably is necessary. Imagine, for example, that a law
enforcement agency, backed by a warrant, seized a laptop
computer belonging to a suspected criminal. Ten or fifteen
years ago the situation would be relatively uncomplicated in
that the data the law enforcement agency would be looking
for would typically be stored on the laptop. But today, it is
equally, or more, likely that the data is stored in the cloud.
Thus, the question arises as to whether the warrant also gives
access to the cloud data e data that may be equally easy to
access as the data stored locally on the laptop.
This issue came into the limelight to some degree in
Australia during the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legis-
lation Committee's Inquiry into the Intelligence Services
Legislation Amendment Bill 2011. The proposal included a
change of the wording of Paragraph 25(4)(a) of the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) from
“stored in the target computer”, to “held in the target com-
puter at any time while the warrant is in force”. It was
pointed out in one submission25 that this change remains
focused on data present on a particular computer, and thus
does not cater for cloud computing situations like the one
described above.
This prompted a Supplementary Submission by the At-
torney-General's department in which it was stressed that:
The term data ‘held’ in the target computer is preferred as the
more technologically neutral term. It would clearly encompass
data that is stored on a more permanent basis, such as in a hard
drive, as well as data that may be held in the computer on a
temporary basis or from time to time, as is the intention of the
provision. The amendment further clarifies this intent by
providing that the Attorney-General may issue a computer access
warrant ‘for the purpose of obtaining access to data that is
relevant to the security matters and is held in the target computer
at any time while the warrant is in force’.26
The problem is obvious; where cloud data is not down-
loaded to the target computer during the time of a valid
warrant, it would seem that such data is beyond the warrant.
This, perhaps more than any statement demonstrates how
the law cannot keep up with technology unless there is a set
of general principles that can be applied. In the sameway as a
murder can take place in a myriad of different ways, legis-
lation must adapt to encompass principles of storage of
material. It is here that the practical reality recognised by the
Magistrate in the Microsoft case becomes all important: If a
statute is to be interpreted in the modern global context it25 Submission by Dr Dan Svantesson to the Legal and Consti-
tutional Affairs Legislation Committee's Inquiry into the Intelli-
gence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011, 26 May 2011,
https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/
viewdocument.aspx?id¼3da24ca1-9864-4c55-8183-c17d01d48698.
26 Supplementary submission by the Attorney-General's
Department to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation
Committee's Inquiry into the Intelligence Services Legislation
Amendment Bill 2011, 26 May 2011, https://senate.aph.gov.au/
submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id¼b37cff07-ca19-
4603-8ff9-ab9f50a3db2b at 5.must be interpreted in the light of modern methods e Par-
liaments intention becomes ewhat did the legislature intend
to do having regard to modern jurisprudence and modern
communication e the alternative is endless qualifications
which make legislation even more unworkable. This is not to
say that the sensibilities of the State that is the subject of the
warrant need to be offended but that the global community
acts together in the context of evidence collection e
balancing together rights and responsibilities. In our view,
this can work but only with reasoned approaches and effec-
tive scrutiny.3.2. Human Rights
We recognise that the prevalence of cybercrime is used as a
justification for intrusive surveillance and over regulation.27
Intrusive surveillance and over regulation threaten privacy
right of individuals.28 The major issue in the Microsoft case
that has caused so much intervention is the risk that
competing interests on an individual, corporate, government
and global level will not be balanced. The same concerns arose
in the Court of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (CJEU) decision in
the case of Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espa~nola de Proteccion de
Datos (AEPD)29 to require Google to enforce a so-called ‘right to
be forgotten’ (more accurately, a ‘right to delisting’) which
effectively makes Google responsible for Internet regulation,
creating fears about control of the Internet.
Data privacy was obviously a key element in the Microsoft
cloud case discussed here. While in that case we saw a clash
between the European emphases on data privacy on the one
hand, and U.S. calls for efficient law enforcement on the other
hand, the reality is of course both more nuanced and more
complex.
As has been pointed out elsewhere,30 when discussing
privacy in the context of cyber crime it is important to bear in
mind that, privacy is typically negatively affected by both
cyber crime, and attempts to address cybercrime. This
dualism places regulators in a difficult position as their at-
tempts to protect against, and investigate, cyber crime, may
involve methods that are in themselves privacy invasive.
Thus, regulators will often have to balance the protection of
privacy with the need to effectively address cyber crime.
In performing such a balancing act, regulatorsmust bear in
mind that privacy is a fundamental human right. Perhaps
most importantly, privacy is a recognised human right in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).Treating data like the sale of goods: Lessons for the Internet from OECD
and CISG and sacking Google as the regulator, 30 CHAR. DAR. UNIV.
COMP. L. & SEC. REV.469 (2014).
28 Race to the Bottom”
Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, 5 (Aug. 10, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/
china0806/3.htm.
29 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espa~nola de Proteccion
de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzalez (Case C-131/12).
30 Submission by the Australian Privacy Foundation In response
to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Com-
munications' Cyber Crime Inquiry (6 August, 2009), https://www.
privacy.org.au/Papers/Cybercrime-090805.doc.
c om p u t e r l aw & s e c u r i t y r e v i ew 3 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 7 8e4 8 9 485Consequently, privacy protection is not optional e a regulator
must take account of peoples’ legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy in any attempt to regulate, and investigate, cyber crime.
In July 2012, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a res-
olution affirming the application of rights online, especially
freedom of expression. This resolution confirmed that both
Articles 19 of the The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and ICCPR are “applicable regardless of frontiers and
through any media of one's choice”31 and that any attempt by
governments to illegitimately censor or block Internet content
would be incompatible with those instruments.32 More
recently, on June 20, 2014, the Council called upon all states to
address the protection of these common standards in laws
that pertain to the Internet.33 In the Microsoft case the court
was concerned with the contents of a server. Whilst ano-
nymity is part of the culture in relation to the Internet, here
the consideration related to business communications. Ac-
cording to the UN Special Rapporteur, Frank La Rue commu-
nications should remain secure, i.e. “individuals should be
able to verify that their communications are received only by
their intended recipients, without interference or alteration,
and that the communications they receive are equally free
from intrusion.” If individuals wish to be anonymous in their
communication, this must be preserved so that individuals
may “express themselves freely without fear of retribution or
condemnation.”34 In a recent report by the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, it is reiterated that any
State “surveillance measures must not arbitrarily or unlaw-
fully interfere with an individual's privacy, family, home or
correspondence; Governmentsmust take specificmeasures to
ensure protection of the law against such interference”.35 The
collection and retention of communications data amounts to
an “interference … whether or not those data are subse-
quently consulted or used.”36
The ICCPR provides for the freedomof expression in Article
19(2):31 U.N. Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and
enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, para. 1, A/HRC/20/L.13
(June 29, 2012).
32 Id. at para. 15.
33 U.N. Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and
enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, para. 5, A/HRC/26/L.24
(June 20, 2014) (“Calls upon all States to address security concerns
on the Internet in accordance with their international human
rights obligations to ensure protection of freedom of expression,
freedom of association, privacy and other human rights online,
including through national democratic, transparent institutions,
based on the rule of law, in a way that ensures freedom and se-
curity on the Internet so that it can continue to be a vibrant force
that generates economic, social and cultural development”.).
34 Id. at para. 23.
35 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, The right to privacy in the digital age, para. 15, A/HRC/
27/37 (June 30, 2014) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf.
36 Id. at para. 20; See also, Weber and Saravia v. Germany, App. No.
54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 78 (2006); Malone v. UK, App. No. 8691/
79, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 64 (1984) (Both of these ECtHR cases indicate
that even the mere possibility of communications information
being captured creates an interference with the right to privacy).Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.37
If we are considering global conventions and/or the
balancing exercise that an individual judge has to engage in
then it is important to remember that this right is a qualified
right and can be restricted, per Article 19(3). The requirement
of a limitation to be “provided by law” requires that the law
should be “formulated with sufficient precision” to enable an
individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it
must be made accessible to the public”.38 The law must also
“provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their
execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expres-
sion are properly restricted and what sorts are not”.39 Any
restriction must be proportionate to the protective aim and
must be the least intrusive measure.40 This principle of pro-
portionality must also account for the form of the expression,
including its means of dissemination.41 Here it seems those
requirements were not available and the Magistrate in the
Microsoft case filled the gap.4. Components of a solution
In the above, we have highlighted several serious issues facing
law enforcement, prosecutors and private parties seeking to
secure access to extraterritorial evidence, not least in the
cloud computing context. There can be no doubt that much
work is needed to address these issues, but equally, there can
be no doubt that we must address these issues.
In the below, we discuss some mechanisms that are of
relevance and that should be considered in future attempts at
improving the operation of the law in this field.
4.1. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Any search for solutions in this field must take as its point of
departure the observation that there is already a system in
place for law enforcement agencies accessing data in a foreign
country like how the U.S. government wanted to access data
held in Ireland. The previously mentioned MLAT regime is in
place in relation to a number of countries, including Ireland:
Mutual Legal Assistance is an agreement, usually by treaty,
between two or more countries to provide assistance to each other
on criminal legal matters. The types of assistance that can be
provided through MLA include: service of documents; search and
seizure; restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime; provision37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
Article 19(2) (emphasis added).
38 General Comment No. 34, supra note 23 at para. 25; See also,
Communication No. 578/1994, de Groot v. The Netherlands, Views
adopted on 14 July 1995.
39 General Comment No. 34, supra note 23 at para. 25.
40 Id. at para. 34.
41 Id.
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evidence from witnesses. The agreements themselves, whilst
indicating the points of contact in both countries, do not specify
the end to-end process. This is governed by a mixture of national
laws: laws covering international co-operation and laws relating
what is being requested. TheMLA process is therefore determined
by a combination of domestic law and bilateral and multilateral
treaties on international crime. MLA is resilient because it is the
only process that ties together the laws of both receiving and
requesting country, making it legally robust at all stages.42 (in-
ternal footnotes removed)
In the Microsoft case, the parties present very different
views of the efficiency of the MLAT system. Microsoft states
that:
If the Government needs to obtain any private papers from
Ireland [...] it relies on the MLAT or other bilateral arrangements
to do so. [...] The MLATs create well-defined procedures to obtain
the precise type of private emails at issue here. In fact, some of the
processes are superior to the ones in place for physical evidence.43
In contrast, U.S. Government observes that:
Microsoft's rosy view of the efficacy of the MLAT process bears
little resemblance to reality. [… ] an MLAT request typically takes
months to process, with the turnaround time varying widely
based on the foreign country's willingness to cooperate, the law
enforcement resources it has to spare for outside requests for
assistance, and the procedural idiosyncrasies of the country's
legal system.44
Importantly, Microsoft's view gains support from the
amicus brief filed by the Irish Government: “Ireland continues
to facilitate cooperation with other states, including the
United States, in the fight against crime and would be pleased
to consider, as expeditiously as possible, a request under the
treaty, should one be made”.45
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the U.S. Gov-
ernment's complaints about the MLAT process would have
been more relevant to the case at hand had they been able to
point to particular difficulties getting Irish cooperation under
the MLAT system prior to seeking a domestic warrant.42 Kent, Gail, Sharing Investigation Specific Data with Law
Enforcement - An International Approach (February 14, 2014).
Stanford Public Law Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract¼2472413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2472413, at 5.
43 Brief by Appellant Microsoft Corporation, In the Matter of a
Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corporation (No. 14-2985-cv) at 57e58.
44 Government's Brief in Support of the Magistrate Judge's De-
cision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose Re-
cords Within its Custody and Control, In the Matter of a Warrant to
Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Micro-
soft Corporation (1:13-mj-02814) at 25e26.
45 Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft Cor-
poration by Ireland, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-
mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation (No.
14-2985-cv) at 8.Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the MLAT system
needs a substantial overhaul. One leading commentator in
this fielde Gail Kente has pointed to set of principles that can
guide future work on the topic of MLATs:
We should be explicit about the principles underpinning
international data sharing. From looking at work carried
out by the separate stakeholder groups, these principles
could be:
i. respect human rights, notably the right to privacy and
freedom of expression as outlined in the United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
ii. focus on sharing data to support the investigation of
serious crimes, organized crimes, terrorism and cyber-
crime clearly impacting on the jurisdiction making the
request. It should also support existing measures to
prevent threats to life and harm to children;
iii. not support any intervention or activities of a political,
military, religious or racial character. There must be
integrity of motive, with no hidden agendas on the
stated purpose of the investigation or the reasonable
belief that an offense was committed;
iv. support requests for information that are proportionate
and necessary to the investigation, including relating to
specific accounts and specific investigations;
v. support requests that are lawfully authorized and
where this authorization can be authenticated;
vi. provide simplicity and clarity: all stakeholders e service
providers, users, government and law enforcement e
deserve clear and simple rules;
vii. be transparent to all stakeholders, including internet
users, internet service providers, governments, law
enforcement, academics and non-governmental
organizations;
viii. support joint working between government and the
private sector nationally and internationally to effec-
tively tackle crime;
ix. support effective global co-operation to tackle crime by
providing an efficient and secure system;
x. have national and international governance and safe-
guarding structures, collectively determined by partici-
pants, that support the principles and ensure the long
term success of the system 46; (internal footnotes and
some formatting removed)
In any case, it is not our aim here to analyse in depth the
efficiency of the MLAT system. It is, however, important to
remember that any alternative path one proposes will operate
side-by-side with this existing established system; it will be
complimenting the MLAT system.46 Kent, Gail, Sharing Investigation Specific Data with Law
Enforcement - An International Approach (February 14, 2014).
Stanford Public Law Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract¼2472413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2472413, at 10. See also: Westmoreland, Kate and Kent, Gail, In-
ternational Law Enforcement Access to User Data: A Survival
Guide and Call for Action (January 8, 2015). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract¼2547289 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2547289.
47 Government's Brief in Support of the Magistrate Judge's De-
cision to Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose Re-
cords Within its Custody and Control, In the Matter of a Warrant to
Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Micro-
soft Corporation (1:13-mj-02814) at 18e19.
48 Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft Cor-
poration by Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European
Parliament, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail
Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation (No. 14-
2985-cv) at 8.
49 Id. at 10.
50 Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft Cor-
poration by Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European
Parliament, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail
Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation (No. 14-
2985-cv) at 9.
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interpretation in this context necessarily invokes the need for
uniformity of approaches in procedure. This, of itself will
make MLAT requests or global warrant enforcement more
efficient. Here we return to our investment or investment
fraud example above. If these issues in relation to evidential
collection are not effective then all that can be done is to
investigate individual actors within a particular jurisdiction
relying on requests from other countries with different and
often lengthy procedures. This means that, if the hub of the
activity is extraterritorial, then those at the top of a trans-
national enterprise will escape the scrutiny that comes with
litigation or criminal prosecution. Victimswill find that crimes
go unpunished and genuine litigants will find no one to sue.
The idea of global cooperation in such a context is of course
likely to take a long time to develop and resolve. Given the
recent conduct of the US in a surveillance context there is
inevitable fear that one super power will use such an
approach to ride rough shod over other national interests.
Whilst the conversation on these issues has started in the
context of the Microsoft case, we suggest there are other
practical solutions which can be achieved in a swifter time-
scale. These can include uniformity of legal definitions and
uniformity of police procedure thus reducing arguments on
extradition as to whether an act in one country is defined in
the same way in another and ensuring that evidence is
collected properly in accordance with uniform procedures in
each country e here we can think of collecting police con-
fessions or downloading material using methods that are
reliable and admissible in court. Such practicalities also then
avoid arguments that evidence collected across nations then
becomes inadmissible because the method of collection is
considered improper in the country that has the nexus for
prosecutorial jurisdiction. Super principles across jurisdic-
tions will fail if basic methodology is unreliable. Such issues
arise not just in relation to Internet intermediaries but
particularly those involved in combatting transnational
organised crime. Here the issue is not so much the proper law
for the conduct of litigation but the collection of relevant ev-
idence across territorial borders.
4.2. Access through service providers
Tying questions of jurisdiction exclusively to the location of
the server has never been a good idea, and here, we want to
outline a possible alternative. To prepare ground for that, it is
useful to bear in mind that while Microsoft is one of the
parties, the real dispute in the case is, as has been noted
above, actually betweenU.S.’s claims of jurisdiction in the law
enforcement setting on the one hand, and European data
privacy values on the other. Thus, we must analyse both the
U.S. standpoint and that of the EU.
The position of the U.S. Government is summarised in a
statement made in its brief:
[T]he SCA [Stored Communications Act] warrant at issue does not
involve any “extraterritorial application” of U.S. law. Instead, as
Judge Francis held, the law is being applied exclusively within the
United Statesdto a domestic provider [Microsoft] served within
U.S. territory and subject to the personal jurisdiction of the issuingcourt. [… ] The fact that a provider may need to retrieve records
from abroad in order to do so, due to the provider's own record-
keeping practices, does not render the SCA “extraterritorial.”47
In other words, as there is no ‘boots on ground’ in Ireland,
there is no extraterritorial claim of jurisdiction. We do not
agree with this narrow and outdated view of extraterritori-
ality. However, as illustrated above, there can be no doubt that
the concerns the U.S. is seeking to address are very real.
The EU position in matters such as this has become
increasingly clear over the discussions of its proposed data
privacy Regulation. However, here, it is most convenient to
analyse the amicus brief filed in the case by a Member of the
European Parliament e Jan Philipp Albrecht. For example,
Albrecht states that “The content of that [the relevant] email
account is located inside the EU and the customer therefore
must benefit from the protections of EU law”.,48 and that: “For
U.S. law to treat data stored in Europe as if it were stored in
the United States is a territorial encroachment without
justification, and one which is exacerbated by the sharp dif-
ferences in the legal status of personal data in the U.S. and
the EU”.49
From our perspective, views such as that ‘if data is located
inside the EU it must benefit from the protections of EU law’
are too simplistic as a solution even if they arguably amount to
a correct description of the legal landscape under current
thinking. And indeed, in Albrecht's amicus we can find hints,
be as it may unintentionally communicated hints, at a better
approach.
In his amicus brief, Albrecht asserts that:
Even if, contrary to the Appellant’s case, the warrant at issue is
capable of applying to the content of the email account, this would
nevertheless give rise to a conflict of jurisdiction. Microsoft would
be required by the warrant, yet it is not permitted under EU law
to transfer the contents of the email account to the U.S.50
But such a conflict may of course have two causes. It may
be caused by an insensitive approach to law enforcement
jurisdiction by the U.S. as in this case. However, it may also be
a result of overly broad jurisdictional claims by the EU's data
privacy law. And, we suggest that typically such conflicts are
results of a combination of both.
As a first step towards a balanced model allowing law
enforcement access to data held overseas, it must be
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by Mr Albrecht, is exorbitant in that it does not correspond
with the EU's legitimate interests. Given the fluidity of data
storage, it is unnecessarily aggressive to argue that all data
located in the EU must automatically be protected by EU data
privacy law. The real interest can usefully be more narrowly
defined as is hinted at by the following statementsmade inMr
Albrecht's amicus brief:
1. The rules governing the handling of personal data in the EU
reflect the high level of sensitivity on the part of EU citizens and
regulators about the protection of personal data.51
2. European citizens are highly sensitive to the differences between
European and U.S. standards on data protection.52
3. Since Ireland hosts many datacenters operated by corporate
groups whose headquarters are located in the United States, the
present case is relevant for a gigantic volume of data held on
behalf millions of EU citizens.53
4. The European Parliament has already noted the practice
whereby, for example, a U.S. prosecutor ignores the EU MLAT
and seeks to compel the disclosure of personal data belonging to
an EU citizen by a technology company.54
All these statements refer to the interest of EU citizens. The
focus of EU data privacy efforts is, or at least should be, pri-
marily directed at the protecting the personal data of EU citi-
zens and others with a strong connection to the EU, such as
permanent residents that are not EU citizens. This sentiment
is also found in a recent document released by the Article 29
Working Party: “Under EU law, everyone has a right to data
protection. In practice, DPAs will focus on claims where there
is a clear link between the data subject and the EU, for
instance where the data subject is a citizen or resident of an
EU Member State”.55 Thus, where a U.S. law enforcement
agency in compliance with U.S. law seeks the assistance of a
U.S. Internet intermediary to access the personal data of a U.S.
citizen and resident, the EU's interest in applying its data
privacy law is perhapsminimal evenwhere that data happens
to sit on a server in e.g. Ireland.
In light of the above, rather than focusing exclusively on
the location of the data in question, it makes sense to place
primary focus on the nationality of the person the data relates
to. At the same time, it must be remembered that an e-mail
accountwill contain both sent and received e-mails. Thus, in a
selection of cases, also the e-mail account of e.g. a U.S. citizen
may have a strong e.g. EU connection justifying the applica-
tion of EU data privacy law.
Consequently, a primary focus on the nationality of the
person the data relates to may usefully be accompanied by
some form of interest or connection testewhere data held in the
EU has a sufficiently strong connection to the EU, EU data51 Id. at 5.
52 Id. at 8.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 10e11.
55 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on the
implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union
judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espa~nola de
Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez” - C-131/
12’ (2014) WP225, at 3.privacy law should prevent U.S. warrant-based access to the
data even where the e-mail account belongs to a U.S. citizen.
In such cases, U.S. law enforcement agencies would have to
rely on the MLAT system.
Furthermore, under any alternative to the MLAT system,
access to data located overseas should obviously only be
providedwhere the government seeking access has legitimate
jurisdiction over the Internet intermediary it calls upon.
Finally, wemay complicate themodel in a number of ways.
For example, we could also consider whether the structure
should go beyond a primary focus on nationality in certain
types of offenses, such as child abuse offenses. However, we
will not pursue such alternatives further here.
One way to summarise, concretise, and hopefully clarify,
the proposal outlined above, is to express it as a legal model
rule. It could, for example, look like this:
Outside a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, an Internet interme-
diary may only disclose personal data it holds in one country, on
behalf of its users, to a law enforcement agency in another
country, where:
(a) the disclosure is mandated by the laws of the country in which
the law enforcement agency is based;
(b) the country in which the law enforcement agency is based has
legitimate jurisdiction over the Internet intermediary;
(c) the person whose data the law enforcement agency is seeking
access to is a national or permanent resident of the country in
which the law enforcement agency is based; and
(d) the personal data to be disclosed lacks a substantial connec-
tion to the country in which the data is held.
The exact operation of this model will depend on how key
terms, such as legitimate jurisdiction and substantial connection
are defined. However, we hope that this proposal may repre-
sent a useful starting point for much needed discussions of
this crucially important issue.5. Concluding remarks
As is widely known, in the late 70's, the OECD developed
guidelines on basic rules governing the transborder flow and
the protection of personal data and privacy. The purpose was
to “facilitate a harmonization of national legislations,
without this precluding at a later date the establishment of
an international Convention.” The Guidelines are described
as “minimum standards for adoption in domestic legislation
… and … .capable of being supplemented by additional
measures for the protection of privacy and individual lib-
erties at the national as well as the international level”. De-
cades on, there remains no internationally accepted set of
principles.56 The global nature of the connectedworld creates56 ILRC comparative research related to Cambodia's Cybercrime
Law prepared for the ABA Justice Defenders Programme by Fe-
licity Gerry QC and Catherine Moore and forthcoming article
GLOBAL CYBERLAW AND HOW CAMBODIA EXPOSED THE
DANGEROUS DRIFT AWAY FROM COMMON HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS also by Felicity Gerry QC and Catherine Moore.
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Microsoft case. Cybercrime laws needs to balance interna-
tional criminal law principles with competing issues of sov-
ereignty in the context of the online global community. The
political effect of such challenges means that there is a vital
need to address these issues. Some states are directly
censoring and controlling the Internet,57 while others place
the responsibility for enforcing the law in the hands of the
trade organizations who stand to gain from their enforce-
ment.58 Recent research by one author here in relation to a
draft Cybercrime law for Cambodia exposed a dangerous
global drift by all States from the necessary common human
rights standards in the context of global cyber law.59 As we
have demonstrated, issuing an “external”warrant to demand
the contents of a foreign server is a potentially draconian
power which has the potential to infringe the human rights
of individual privacy and data protection. States commit-
ment to common human rights standards requires the
formulation of a balanced set of cyber laws and procedures to
combat cybercrime and improve cyber security, without
compromising human rights in all States. The international
convention envisaged by the OECD in the context of privacy is
a proposal made in the context of Cambodian criminal law
that is equally relevant to the litigation involving Microsoft.
And while a general international consensus on data privacy
may be quite premature to date, the Microsoft case highlights
a degree of urgency in finding a solution to access to extra-
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